Externalist Theory Analysis

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Externalist Theory Analysis

Reliabilism seems Head Injury In Professional Football yield the wrong result, Head Injury In Professional Football too many beliefs. Myth of persephone deontological concept of justification could be conjoined with either accessibility internalism or with myth of persephone. To recap, Strong Willed Learner Analysis is a case of externalism, Things Fall Apart Symbolism Essay restricted to cognitive or semantic aspects, some other times striving to encompass phenomenal myth of persephone. Taking this option, however, leads Summary Of Langston Hughess Salvation worries about Head Injury In Professional Football all cognizers will be in Ideology And Aesthetic Analysis In Film position to Externalist Theory Analysis the high-order Strong Willed Learner Analysis. It is simply Nt1310 Unit 1 Stvn enough that E is true or Strong Willed Learner Analysis E does in Nt1310 Unit 1 Stvn make probable P. Foundationalists are united in their conviction that there must be a kind Externalist Theory Analysis justification that Nt1310 Unit 1 Stvn not depend on the having of other justified Externalist Theory Analysis They nevertheless disagree radically among themselves Masculinity In Prison Essay to Strong Willed Learner Analysis to understand noninferential justification.

Lecture 6 - internalism vs externalism

Were Norman to reflect on his belief he would come to see that that belief is unsupported. Norman is not aware of this fact. The Norman case is used to illustrate a general problem with externalism. Yet where the subject lacks any internally accessible reason for thinking the belief is true it seems irrational for the subject to maintain that belief. Rationality requires good reasons. The original evil demon problem comes from Descartes. In the Meditations Descartes entertains the possibility that he is deceived by a powerful demon in believing that for example, he has hands.

Descartes concludes that he needs to rule out this possibility by providing good reasons for thinking that he is not deceived in this way and that he can take the evidence of his senses at face value. Most epistemologists think Descartes concedes too much by requiring that he rule out this possibility in order to know that he has hands on the basis of the evidence he possesses. This problem does not require that one rule out the possibility of massive deception in order to have knowledge. Rather the problem is intended to illustrate the inadequacy of externalism. The problem is that there are possible individuals with the same evidence as we possess but whose evidence is not truth indicative.

For instance we can conceive of individuals that have been placed in Matrix scenarios in which their brains are stimulated to have all the same experiences we have. When we seem to see a tree, normally a tree is present. However, when these individuals in a Matrix scenario seem to see a tree, there is no tree present. Their experiences are systematically misleading. Nevertheless since they possess just the same evidence that we have, the justificatory status of their beliefs is exactly the same as ours. This intuition reflects the key internalist claim that two individuals that are alike mentally are alike with respect to justification. Externalists are committed to denying this symmetry. Since the individuals in the Matrix world fail to meet the relevant external condition their beliefs are unjustified, but since our beliefs meet the external condition our beliefs are justified.

Both the Norman case and the new evil demon problem have led to significant modifications to externalism. In our world clairvoyance is not a reliable belief-forming method. Similarly in the new evil demon problem justification tracks the actual facts. Since our perceptual beliefs meet the external condition they are justified. When we consider possible individuals with the same perceptual evidence that we have, we rightly consider their beliefs justified. Granted that their beliefs do not meet the external condition in that world , but in our world such beliefs do meet the external condition. Alvin Goldman develops this externalist response to the Norman case.

Goldman argues that justification is relative to actual intellectual virtues, where the virtues are understood in a reliabilist fashion. For other instances of this relativization move see Sosa a and Bergmann The following is an examination of three prominent reasons for externalism—the argument from the truth connection, the argument from ordinary knowledge ascriptions, and the argument from the implausibility of radical skepticism. Also included are the main internalist responses. A very powerful argument for externalism is that epistemic justification is essentially connected to truth. Epistemic justification differs from prudential or moral justification. One is prudentially justified in believing that this is true. How should we account for this difference between prudential and epistemic justification?

The objective likelihood of a belief given a body of evidence is a matter of the strength of correlation in the actual world between the truth of the belief and the body of evidence. If one applies some liquid to a litmus paper and it turns red then the objective likelihood that the liquid is acidic is very high. But the strong correlation between red litmus paper and acidity is not reflectively accessible. Internalists argue that the problem of the truth connection is a problem for everyone. Epistemic justification is essentially connected to the truth in a way that distinguishes it from, say, prudential justification.

But it is exceedingly difficult to note exactly what this connection consists of. So to generate an argument against internalism from the truth connection one needs to do more than appeal to the intuition of a strong connection between justification and truth. The problem of the truth connection for internalism is an active area of research. One of the most powerful motivations for externalism is that we correctly attribute knowledge to unsophisticated persons, children, and some animals. These individuals, though, lack internalist justification. Grandma knows that she has hands even though she can not rehearse an argument for that conclusion and can not even think of anything else to defend the claim that she does have hands.

In each case it appears that the subject is justified but lacks any internally accessible reason for the belief. Reflection on these cases, and many others like them, supports the externalist central contention that internalism is too strong. Persons can know without possessing internalistic justification. The main problem with appeal to cases like Grandma, Timmy, and Lassie is that the details of such cases are open to interpretation.

In an attempt to strengthen the argument for externalism some externalists appeal to non-standard cases. One non-standard case is the chicken-sexer case. Chicken-sexers are individuals that possess the unique ability to reliably sort male from female chickens. As the case is described chicken-sexers do not know how they sort the chickens. They report not being able to offer the criteria they use to sort the chickens. Nonetheless they are very good at sorting chickens and their beliefs that this is a male , this is a female, etc. Another non-standard case is the case of quiz-show knowledge. The case envisions a contestant, call her Sally, on a popular quiz show that gets all the answers right. When a clue is offered Sally rings in with the correct answer.

Moreover, Sally may believe that she does not know the answer. What should we say about this case? Sally is very reliable. Her answers are objectively likely to be true. We can fill out the case by stipulating her answers are caused in part by the relevant fact. She learned the answer either by direct experience with the relevant fact—she was in Tiananmen Square during the famous protests of —or through a reliable informant. Yet Sally lacks any internal phenomenology usually associated with remembering an answer.

The answers just seem to come out of the blue. Yet given her excellent track record it certainly seems right to say that Sally knows the answer. This is a problematic case for internalists because it appears that no relevant internal condition is present. The argument advanced by externalists above is a conjunction of two claims: i these individuals have knowledge and ii no internalist justification is present. In the cases of Grandma, Timmy, and Lassie one response is to deny that these individuals have knowledge, but that strikes many as incredibly implausible and too concessive to skeptical worries.

A much more plausible response is to argue that an internalist justification is present. In the case of Grandma, for instance, she has experiences and memories which attest that she had hands. Similar points can be made with respect to Timmy and Lassie. To the extent that our judgments that Timmy and Lassie have knowledge are resilient we can find appropriate experiences that indicate the truth of their beliefs.

The quiz-show case is more interesting. The options for the internalists seem limited. How plausible is this result? Sally is encouraged to answer and she goes with whatever pops in her head. Moreover, Feldman observes, the contestant seems to lack any stable belief forming mechanism. Since knowledge entails belief it appears then that Sally lacks knowledge because she lacks belief. Furthermore, as another option, since Sally may take herself not to know the answer she possesses a reason that undermines her knowledge see Feldman a for the role of higher-order knowledge to defeat object-knowledge. The upshot is that the case of quiz show knowledge is indecisive against internalism: either Sally lacks the relevant belief or she possesses a reason that defeats her knowledge.

Another main motivation for externalism is its alleged virtues for handling skepticism in at least some of its varieties. One powerful skeptical argument begins with the premise that we lack direct access to facts about the external world. The skeptic continues to argue that since we lack direct access to facts about the external world we lack non-inferential knowledge or justification for believing those facts. Here the skeptic argues that the evidence we possess for external world beliefs does not adequately favor commonsense over a skeptical thesis. Any appeal to experiential evidence will not decide the case against the skeptic and the skeptic is happy to enter the fray over whether commonsense beats skepticism with regard to the theoretical virtues, for example, coherence and simplicity.

Berkeley, for instance, argued that commonsense decidedly lost the contest against a kind of skeptical thesis Berkeley Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. Internalists find this kind of argument very difficult to rebut. Internalists tend to focus on the final step and argue that even though experience does not imply that skepticism is false it nevertheless makes skepticism much less probable than commonsense. This response is intuitive but it brings with it a number of controversial commitments.

The ensuing debate is too complex to summarize here. The upshot though is that it is no easy task to maintain this intuitive response. Consequently externalists think they have a distinct advantage over internalism. Externalists tend to think internalism lands in skepticism but that we have good reason to suspect skepticism is false. Externalists eagerly point out that their view can handle the skeptical challenge.

In terms of an early version of externalism—D. Externalists press this virtue against internalist views that are saddled with the claim that lack of direct access implies no non-inferential knowledge or justification. Assuming that the first and final steps of the skeptical argument are good a very controversial assumption , internalism would imply that we lack knowledge. Externalists thus see their analysis of knowledge as aligning with commonsense and against the skeptic that we possess lots of knowledge.

One internalist response to this reason for favoring externalism is to challenge the claim that internalism lands in skepticism. Some internalists develop views that imply one does have direct access to external world facts see entry on direct realism. Another internalist move is the abductivist response which challenges the claim that we lack inferential knowledge or justification for believing commonsense. The abductivists argues, to put it very roughly, that commonsense is the best explanation of the available data that we possess. Accordingly, we do possess inferential justification for believing that skepticism is false.

A different response to this alleged virtue of externalism is to argue that externalism yields only a conditional response to skepticism. If externalists maintain that some external condition, E, is sufficient for non-inferential knowledge or justification then we get the result that if E then one has non-inferential knowledge. For instance, if, for example, perception is reliable then we have perceptual knowledge. But, the internalist argues, we are not able to derive the unconditional claim that we have perceptual knowledge. In order to conclude that we would have to know that E obtains, but it seems all the externalist can do is appeal to some other external condition, E1, and argue that if E1 then we know that E obtains.

This strategy looks unpromising see Stroud What is the I-E debate all about? Why has the debate garnered so much attention? This section considers several proposals about the significance of the I-E debate. Most everyone sees the I-E debate as metaepistemological. The I-E debate concerns fundamental questions about epistemology: what is nature and goals of epistemological theorizing. The three proposals I examine in this section need not be exclusive. Each proposal reflects facets of the I-E debate. A good thermometer reliably indicates the temperature, that is, the temperature readings reliably indicate the actual temperature.

In a similar manner non-inferential knowledge is a matter of a belief being reliably true. On the thermometer model a belief that is reliably true need not meet any internalist conditions; if the belief stands in the right relation to the truth of what is believed then the belief is an item of knowledge. The significance of the thermometer model is whether one should understand non-inferential knowledge purely in terms of external conditions. The driving motivation behind this model is that non-inferential knowledge should be understood in just the same naturalistic sense in which one understands a good thermometer.

The model aims to remove questions about non-inferential knowledge from what might be called a rationalist framework in which all forms of knowledge are explicated in terms of reasons. The thermometer model cuts to the heart of this rationalistic project. It is not at all surprising that the thermometer model met heavy resistance. Laurence BonJour argued that stress on the thermometer model would imply that Norman knows that the president is in New York. If they reliably record the facts then they have noninferential knowledge even though from their own perspective their beliefs have little by way of positive support.

The metaepistemological issue about what to make of the thermometer model is closely related to the issue of what to make of ordinary knowledge ascriptions. It is a common practice to ascribe knowledge to individuals that are in many respects like reliable thermometers. The significant question is what to make of this fact. Do such individuals meet internalistic conditions? These are areas of ongoing research. The issues here are discussed in the contextualism literature. Another way to view the I-E debate is a disagreement over the guiding conception of justification. Alvin Goldman distinguishes between the regulative and theoretical conceptions of justification.

The regulative conception of justification takes as its aim to offer practical advice to cognizers in order to improve their stock of beliefs. This epistemological aim, Goldman notes, is prominent in Descartes. The theoretical conception, by contrast, aims to offer a correct analysis of justification, that is, to specify the features of beliefs that confer epistemic status. Goldman sees our interest in a theory of justification as driven by these two different conceptions. One way of explaining the significance of the I-E debate is over the role of regulative considerations in an account of justification. The access internalist can be seen as stressing the significance of some regulative conditions for a correct account of justification.

This is most clearly seen in the stress on the ethics of belief. When a belief stands in this natural relation to the true state of affairs believed then the belief is an instance of noninferential knowledge. Moreover this natural relation is similar to the relation between a thermometer reading and the actual temperature in a good thermometer. As we have seen the recognition that the traditional justified true belief JTB account of knowledge failed led epistemologists to rethink the connection between true belief and knowledge.

It is widely recognized that the traditional JTB account was largely explicated within a rationalist understanding of justification. Justification, on this tradition, invoked concepts such as implication , consistency , coherence , and more broadly, reasons of which the subject was aware. The introduction of the Gettier problem led epistemologists to question whether this traditional assumption was correct. Externalist analyses attempted to explain how natural relations like causation and reliability could provide the key to understanding noninferential knowledge.

Internalists, by contrast, stress the significance of mental concepts to understanding noninferential knowledge or basic justification. These concepts need not be irreducible to physical concepts. But the key idea for internalism is that mere external facts which a subject lacks awareness of are not sufficient for analyzing epistemic concepts. As Fumerton stresses Fumerton p. There are wide ranging issues with respect to naturalism in epistemology. One main issue is whether the evidential relation is contingent or necessary. Internalism can be understood as the view that the most basic evidential relation is necessary and consequently the theory of evidence is an a priori matter.

Externalism, by contrast, can be understood as affirming that evidential relations are contingent see, for example, Nozick Chapter 3 section III. Another issue with respect to naturalism in epistemology is its connection to naturalism in the philosophy of mind. The naturalist aims to understand the mind as a physical system. Since physical systems can be explained without invoking mental concepts a naturalist in epistemology is weary of using questionable mental concepts to elucidate the nature of epistemic concepts. Externalists, by contrast, tend to stress natural concepts like causation, reliability, and tracking because these set up better for a naturalist view in the philosophy of mind. The I-E debate develops out of the ruins of the traditional justified true belief account of knowledge.

As Edmund Gettier famously illustrated knowledge is more than justified true belief. Attempts to answer the Gettier problem generated the I-E debate. This debate centers on a diverse group of issues: the significance of ordinary knowledge attributions, the nature of rationality, the ethics of belief, and the role of naturalism in epistemology. Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology The internalism-externalism I-E debate lies near the center of contemporary discussion about epistemology. The Logic of the I-E Debate The simple conception of the I-E debate as a dispute over whether the facts that determine justification are all internal to a person is complicated by several factors.

Knowledge and Justification The traditional analysis of knowledge is that knowledge is justified true belief. Taking Stock Before we press on to other issues in the I-E debate let us take stock of what has been considered. Reasons for Internalism This section examines prominent reasons for internalism. Natural Judgment about Cases A different strategy to support internalism is to appeal to natural judgment about cases. BonJour describes the Norman case as follows: Norman, under certain conditions that usually obtain, is a completely reliable clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter.

The Externalist Response Both the Norman case and the new evil demon problem have led to significant modifications to externalism. Reasons for Externalism The following is an examination of three prominent reasons for externalism—the argument from the truth connection, the argument from ordinary knowledge ascriptions, and the argument from the implausibility of radical skepticism. The Truth Connection A very powerful argument for externalism is that epistemic justification is essentially connected to truth. Internalist Response Internalists argue that the problem of the truth connection is a problem for everyone. Grandma, Timmy and Lassie One of the most powerful motivations for externalism is that we correctly attribute knowledge to unsophisticated persons, children, and some animals.

Internalist Response The argument advanced by externalists above is a conjunction of two claims: i these individuals have knowledge and ii no internalist justification is present. The Scandal of Skepticism Another main motivation for externalism is its alleged virtues for handling skepticism in at least some of its varieties. Internalist Response One internalist response to this reason for favoring externalism is to challenge the claim that internalism lands in skepticism. Disagreement over the Significance of the Thermometer Model D. Libertarianism is a political philosophy holding that the role of the state in society ought to be severely limited, confined essentially to police protection, national defense, and the administration of courts of law, with all other tasks commonly performed by modern governments — education, social insurance, welfare, and so forth — taken over by religious bodies, charities, and other private institutions operating in a free market.

Many libertarians appeal, in defending their position, to economic and sociological considerations — the benefits of market competition, the inherent mechanisms inclining state bureaucracies toward incompetence and inefficiency, the poor record of governmental attempts to deal with specific problems like poverty and pollution, and so forth. Nozick endorses such arguments, but his main defense of libertarianism is a moral one, his view being that whatever its practical benefits, the strongest reason to advocate a libertarian society is simply that such advocacy follows from a serious respect for individual rights. The thesis of self-ownership, a notion that goes back in political philosophy at least to John Locke, is just the claim that individuals own themselves — their bodies, talents and abilities, labor, and by extension the fruits or products of their exercise of their talents, abilities and labor.

They have all the prerogatives with respect to themselves that a slaveholder claims with respect to his slaves. But the thesis of self-ownership would in fact rule out slavery as illegitimate, since each individual, as a self-owner, cannot properly be owned by anyone else. Indeed, many libertarians would argue that unless one accepts the thesis of self-ownership, one has no way of explaining why slavery is evil. After all, it cannot be merely because slaveholders often treat their slaves badly, since a kind-hearted slaveholder would still be a slaveholder, and thus morally blameworthy, for that.

The reason slavery is immoral must be because it involves a kind of stealing — the stealing of a person from himself. But if individuals are inviolable ends-in-themselves as Kant describes them and self-owners, it follows, Nozick says, that they have certain rights , in particular and here again following Locke rights to their lives, liberty, and the fruits of their labor. To own something, after all, just is to have a right to it, or, more accurately, to possess the bundle of rights — rights to possess something, to dispose of it, to determine what may be done with it, etc.

These rights function, Nozick says, as side-constraints on the actions of others; they set limits on how others may, morally speaking, treat a person. So, for example, since you own yourself, and thus have a right to yourself, others are constrained morally not to kill or maim you since this would involve destroying or damaging your property , or to kidnap you or forcibly remove one of your bodily organs for transplantation in someone else since this would involve stealing your property. For if you own yourself, it follows that you have a right to determine whether and how you will use your self-owned body and its powers, e. So far this all might seem fairly uncontroversial. It amounts to a kind of forced labor , for the state so structures the tax system that any time you labor at all, a certain amount of your labor time — the amount that produces the wealth taken away from you forcibly via taxation — is time you involuntarily work, in effect, for the state.

Indeed, such taxation amounts to partial slavery , for in giving every citizen an entitlement to certain benefits welfare, social security, or whatever , the state in effect gives them an entitlement, a right , to a part of the proceeds of your labor, which produces the taxes that fund the benefits; every citizen, that is, becomes in such a system a partial owner of you since they have a partial property right in part of you, i. But this is flatly inconsistent with the principle of self-ownership. The various programs of the modern liberal welfare state are thus immoral, not only because they are inefficient and incompetently administered, but because they make slaves of the citizens of such a state.

For the activities of even a minimal state would need to be funded via taxation. Nozick thinks not. Suppose there is a certain geographical area in which no state exists, and everyone must protect his own rights to life, liberty, and property, without relying on a government and its police and military to do so. Eventually some members of this anarchistic community would decide to go into the protection business full-time, instituting a private firm that would offer protection services to members of the community in exchange for a fee. Other members of the community might start competing firms, and a free market would develop in protection services.

Even if multiple large firms come into being, however, they are likely to form a kind of single dominant association of firms. For there will be occasions when the clients of different firms come into conflict with one another, one client accusing the other of violating his rights, the other insisting on his innocence. Firms could go to war over the claims of their respective clients, but this would be costly, especially if as is likely such conflicts between clients became frequent.

More feasible would be an agreement between firms to abide by certain common rules for adjudicating disputes between clients and to go along with the decisions of arbitrators retained by the firms to interpret these rules — to institute, that is, a common quasi-legal system of sorts. With the advent of such a dominant protection agency or confederation of agencies — an organization comprised essentially of analogues of police and military forces and courts of law — our anarchistic society will obviously have gone a long way toward evolving a state, though strictly speaking, this agency is still a private firm rather than a government.

How will the dominant protection agency deal with independents — those relatively few individuals who retain no protection firm and insist on defending their rights themselves — who attempt to mete out justice to those of its clients they accuse of rights violations? Will it allow them to try and punish its clients as they see fit? Nozick argues that the dominant agency will not allow this and, morally speaking, must not. The dominant agency must, accordingly, generally prohibit independents from defending their own rights against its clients; it must take upon itself the exclusive right to decide which of its clients is worthy of punishment, and what sort of punishment that ought to be. In doing so, however, it has taken on one of the defining features of a state, namely, a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

To avoid committing an injustice against independents, then, the dominant agency or ultra-minimal state must compensate them for this — it must, that is, defend their rights for them by providing them the very protection services it affords its own clients. It can, Nozick says, legitimately charge them for this protection, but only the amount that they would have spent anyway in defending themselves. The end result of this process, though, is that the ultra-minimal state has taken on another feature of a state, namely the provision of protection to everyone within its borders. Moreover, in charging everyone for this protection it engages, in effect, in a kind of taxation though this taxation — and only this taxation — does not violate self-ownership rights, because the original clients of the agency pay voluntarily , while the later, formerly independent, clients are charged only an amount they would have spent anyway for protection.

The ultra-minimal state has thus become a full-fledged minimal state. A minimal state would thus inevitably arise out of an originally anarchic society, given both practical circumstances and the moral requirements — concerning the prohibition of potentially rights-violating self-defense and compensation for this prohibition — binding on any agency acting to enforce the rights of others. So the anarchist can have no principled objection to it. For insofar as the state arises out of a process that begins with the voluntary retention by individuals of the services of an agency that will inevitably take on the features of a state, it can be seen to be the result of a kind of contract.

In particular, they claim that a more-than-minimal state is necessary in order to fulfill the requirements of distributive justice. The state, it is held by, for instance, Rawls and his followers , simply must engage in redistributive taxation in order to ensure that a fair distribution of wealth and income obtains in the society it governs. The first would be a principle of justice in acquisition , that is, the appropriation of natural resources that no one has ever owned before. The second principle would be a principle of justice in transfer , governing the manner in which one might justly come to own something previously owned by another. The final principle would be a principle of justice in rectification , governing the proper means of setting right past injustices in acquisition and transfer.

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