Case Study: Police Officer Vs. Rodriguez Car

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Case Study: Police Officer Vs. Rodriguez Car



Our main goal is foucault disciplinary power prevent and reduce crime in our city. Chua vs. United Why College Isn T For Everyone Essay Business ethical issues v. Hayden turned away and put his hand in his pocket. Views Read Edit View history. Scope of the Fourth Personal Narrative: My State Tournament. The dissent counters that our cases discussing probable cause and reasonable suspicion, most notably Ornelas v. Gallegos refused to Case Study: Police Officer Vs. Rodriguez Car for the officer. Michigan Department of State Police v.

Larissa Rodriguez tells her story in confession tape

This is a very curious remand order. This suggestion to the court of appeals appears to have little to do with statutory construction, and more to do with the type of evidence or testimony that the court will accept in determining the status or nature of a particular piece of property. This decision solely turns on whether the defendant was harmed, so it is pretty case-specific. There is no longer a general duty to retreat on the part of a defendant. That was removed from the statute in , and after the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Morales v. Just as in Ritz v. We are not at liberty to disturb it. This was a prosecution under Section 20A.

There is not really much else to be gained from these two decisions—there is a dispute and not all of the judges on the Court of Criminal Appeals agree on the resolution of the dispute. The Legislature almost certainly meant for Section 20A. Did the trial court have authority to order the State to dismiss a re-filed charging instrument based on a promise by the prosecutor to dismiss the original felony charge in exchange for guilty pleas in other misdemeanor cases that were also subsequently dismissed?

Although a county attorney or district attorney has the authority to dismiss a prosecution, it is only with the approval of the trial court. Code of Criminal Procedure Art. This decision does not turn on whether the prosecutor promised, even though the prosecutor testified that he did not promise. Defense counsel said that the trial prosecutor promised, and the trial court made a finding that a promise was made.

This decision instead turns on whether the trial court approved of the promise—the grant of immunity or perhaps the plea agreement. Case law is clear that the trial court must approve. This case could be a good reminder to get the terms of your plea agreement—ALL of the terms—documented in writing. The driver has not violated the law, but neither has the officer violated the Fourth Amendment. In this case, an officer stopped a vehicle because one of its two brake lights was out, but a court later determined that a single working brake light was all the law required.

The question presented is whether such a mistake of law can nonetheless give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold the seizure under the Fourth Amendment. We hold that it can. Shortly before 8 a. A few miles down the road, the Escort braked as it approached a slower vehicle, but only the left brake light came on. Two men were in the car: Maynor Javier Vasquez sat behind the wheel, and petitioner Nicholas Brady Heien lay across the rear seat. Sergeant Darisse explained to Vasquez that as long as his license and registration checked out, he would receive only a warning ticket for the broken brake light.

A records check revealed no problems with the documents, and Darisse gave Vasquez the warning ticket. But Darisse had become suspicious during the course of the stop—Vasquez appeared nervous, Heien remained lying down the entire time, and the two gave inconsistent answers about their destination. Darisse asked Vasquez if he would be willing to answer some questions. Vasquez assented, and Darisse asked whether the men were transporting various types of contraband.

Told no, Darisse asked whether he could search the Escort. Vasquez said he had no objection, but told Darisse he should ask Heien, because Heien owned the car. Heien gave his consent, and Darisse, aided by a fellow officer who had since arrived, began a thorough search of the vehicle. In the side compartment of a duffle bag, Darisse found a sandwich bag containing cocaine. The officers arrested both men. The State charged Heien with attempted trafficking in cocaine. Heien moved to suppress the evidence seized from the car, contending that the stop and search had violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Heien pleaded guilty but reserved his right to appeal the suppression decision.

The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed. The initial stop was not valid, the court held, because driving with only one working brake light was not actually a violation of North Carolina law. The relevant provision of the vehicle code provides that a car must be. The stop lamp shall display a red or amber light visible from a distance of not less than feet to the rear in normal sunlight, and shall be actuated upon application of the service foot brake.

The stop lamp may be incorporated into a unit with one or more other rear lamps. But the court concluded that, for several reasons, Sergeant Darisse could have reasonably, even if mistakenly, read the vehicle code to require that both brake lights be in good working order. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed in turn. We granted certiorari. The Fourth Amendment provides:. Brendlin v. California , U. Prado Navarette v. The question here is whether reasonable suspicion can rest on a mistaken understanding of the scope of a legal prohibition. We have recognized that searches and seizures based on mistakes of fact can be reasonable.

The warrantless search of a home, for instance, is reasonable if undertaken with the consent of a resident, and remains lawful when officers obtain the consent of someone who reasonably appears to be but is not in fact a resident. See Illinois v. See Hill v. But reasonable men make mistakes of law, too, and such mistakes are no less compatible with the concept of reasonable suspicion. The officer may be reasonably mistaken on either ground. Whether the facts turn out to be not what was thought, or the law turns out to be not what was thought, the result is the same: the facts are outside the scope of the law. There is no reason, under the text of the Fourth Amendment or our precedents, why this same result should be acceptable when reached by way of a reasonable mistake of fact, but not when reached by way of a similarly reasonable mistake of law.

The dissent counters that our cases discussing probable cause and reasonable suspicion, most notably Ornelas v. Post , at 2—3 opinion of Sotomayor, J. It would have been surprising, of course, if they had, since none of those cases involved a mistake of law. Although such recent cases did not address mistakes of law, older precedents did. In fact, cases dating back two centuries support treating legal and factual errors alike in this context. Customs statutes enacted by Congress not long after the founding authorized courts to issue certificates indemnifying customs officers against damages suits premised on unlawful seizures. Emery , 97 U. Riddle , 5 Cranch In United States v.

Riddle , a customs officer seized goods on the ground that the English shipper had violated the customs laws by preparing an invoice that undervalued the merchandise, even though the American consignee declared the true value to the customs collector. This holding—that reasonable mistakes of law, like those of fact, would justify certificates of probable cause—was reiterated in a number of 19th-century decisions.

The Reindeer , 27 F. The Recorder , 27 F. Riddle and its progeny are not directly on point. Chief Justice Marshall was not construing the Fourth Amendment , and a certificate of probable cause functioned much like a modern-day finding of qualified immunity, which depends on an inquiry distinct from whether an officer has committed a constitutional violation. Carman , ante, at 7 per curiam. It imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion. United States , 7 Cranch , No decision of this Court in the two centuries since has undermined that understanding.

The contrary conclusion would be hard to reconcile with a much more recent precedent. In Michigan v. Detroit police officers sent to investigate a report of public intoxication arrested Gary DeFillippo after he failed to identify himself. A search incident to arrest uncovered drugs, and DeFillippo was charged with possession of a controlled substance. Accepting the unconstitutionality of the ordinance as a given, we nonetheless reversed.

The officers were wrong in concluding that DeFillippo was guilty of a criminal offense when he declined to iden- tify himself. See Danforth v. Minnesota , U. Although DeFillippo could not be prosecuted under the identifica- tion ordinance, the search that turned up the drugs was constitutional. Heien struggles to recast DeFillippo as a case solely about the exclusionary rule, not the Fourth Amendment itself. We did say in a footnote that suppression of the evidence found on DeFillippo would serve none of the purposes of the exclusionary rule. But that literally marginal discussion does not displace our express holding that the arrest was constitutionally valid because the officers had probable cause.

Leon , U. Gates , U. See Brief for Petitioner 28— Krull , U. Florida v. Royer , US -An investigative detention must be conducted in a manner that is no more intrusive than necessary to establish or dispel the officer's suspicions. Kolender v. Lawson , U. The Supreme Court held that the statute was, "unconstitutionally vague on its face because it encourages arbitrary enforcement by failing to describe with sufficient particularity what a suspect must do in order to satisfy the statute. Michigan v. Long , U. Rodriguez , U. It was a consensual encounter and, therefore, was not a "seizure. Hensley , U. Officers can rely on a "wanted flyer" issued on reasonable suspicion to stop a person. Bostick , US -The standard for determining a "seizure" is not if a person feels free to leave, but whether the person feels free to decline the requests of the officer.

Gallegos v. City of Colorado Springs F. Court -A police officer can take precautionary measures to restrain a person during a "Terry" stop. In this case, the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain Gallegos. Gallegos refused to stop for the officer. The officer grabbed him. He pulled away and kept walking. This occurred a couple of times until Gallegos turned and took a fighting stance. Gallegos was taken to the ground with an arm bar. Illinois v. Wardlow , US -The unprovoked flight of a person, upon seeing the police, in a high crime area, gives the officer reasonable suspicion to chase and detain him. Neff , F. See Perdue, 8 F. Further, the "use of guns in connection with a stop is permissible where the police reasonably believe the weapons are necessary for their protection.

Hensley, U. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada , U. Humphries , F. Additional factors must be present to localize the presence of marijuana such that its placement will justify either the search or the arrest. Since the smell of marijuana could be localized to him, the officer had probable cause to stop and arrest him. The arrest led to the discovery and drugs and a gun on his person. Williams , F. As indicated above, the police in J. Here, the police officers seized Williams and searched him only after his own conduct gave them reasonable suspicion to believe he was possibly armed and dangerous.

When the officers first approached the table where Williams was sitting, they simply informed Williams and his associates that there had been a report of a firearm and asked to search each individual for weapons. The officers did eventually seize Williams, but only after they observed him behaving suspiciously, fidgeting in his seat and keeping his hands in his pockets despite repeated requests to place them on the table, thereby giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that he had a weapon in his pocket. The district court therefore properly denied Williams' motion to suppress the firearm. Samson v. California , U. He was arrested.

The Court held: The suspicionless search of the parolee Samson by a police officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Paulette , 6th Cir. The court also said that the officers were allowed to search the defendant for weapons because of the frequency in which drug dealers carry weapons. Arizona V. Johnson , US 07— -A vehicle was lawfully stopped on traffic for a violation. During the course of the traffic stop, one of the officers on the scene talked to the passenger, Johnson.

The encounter was consensual and was not related to any criminal matter. The officer developed reasonable suspicion that Johnson may be armed and pat searched him. A gun was found and he was arrested.

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