Ghaidan V Godin-mendoza 2004

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Ghaidan V Godin-mendoza 2004

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EU Charter vs Human Rights Convention - what's the difference?

An approach which is often, perhaps increasingly, adopted is for the court to adopt proportionality as a tool by which it can structure its analysis of the conflict. There are many variations in the ways courts formulate proportionality, but for my purposes nothing hangs on these differences. Essentially, each formulation has several common elements: first, where a limit is placed on a claimed right, the court should first establish whether that limit furthers a legitimate aim; secondly, the court should consider whether the means chosen to achieve this aim are rationally connected to that aim; thirdly, the court should consider whether the measure is proportionate in the strict sense, meaning that the court should consider whether there are any means available to achieve the objective which are less restrictive of the claimed right, and whether the benefits of restriction outweigh the harms.

A problem which is commonly identified with proportionality analysis, however, is that the proportionality test requires the injection of a significant element of value judgement in at least two particular parts of the test: in determining whether the aim of the restrictive measure furthers a legitimate objective, and in carrying out the final balancing exercise. Rather than solving the problem of incommensurability, the court is still faced with the problem and the courts resort to similar techniques described in the previous paragraphs: deference to legislative judgment, creating a hierarchy of rights, engaging in crude utilitarian balancing, or, as Waldron identifies, requiring that reasons be given explaining the considerations upon which the governmental decision was arrived at and scrutinizing the adequacy of such reasons.

The use of dignity is particularly associated with those jurisdictions which have adopted proportionality analysis, whether that word is used or not. That is not coincidental, I think. One important institutional function for dignity is to provide a language in which courts can indicate the weighting given to particular rights and other values in this context. When a particular right or other value is described as engaging dignity, this indicates that the court considers that considerable even in some cases overwhelming weight should be attributed to it. The Act was challenged as unconstitutional. In deciding the case, the FCC identified the conflicting interests at stake as the mother's right to personality under Article 2 1 and the state's duty to protect life under Article 2 2.

Faced with balancing the mother's rights and the state's duty to protect life, the FCC turned to dignity. Once dignity entered the balancing calculus on the side of the life interest, the conclusion that the protection of the foetus's life must receive priority over the women's freedom was inevitable. Thus, the FCC relied heavily on dignity to tip the scales in favour of finding the act unconstitutional, and restrict the rights of the mother. The FCC decided that, despite its potential to avert a major disaster and save thousands of lives, the law was impermissible because it infringed the guarantee of human dignity to the extent that it allowed the lives of innocent people to be taken to save the lives of others. The FCC's use of dignity here resembles the use of dignity in the First Abortion Case because in both cases the FCC invoked dignity in conjunction with the right to life in order to imbue that right with a weight which justified the application of strict scrutiny when assessing whether incursions into the right were acceptable, and found that they were not.

So, too, when the FCC in the Second Abortion decision wanted to give greater weight to the rights of the woman, it began using the concept of dignity to describe those rights, thus indicating that they should be accorded greater recognition than in the First Abortion decision. In the Second Abortion decision, the FCC departed from its technique of attributing dignity primarily to the life interest in the foetus.

Dignity was no longer used to tip the scales in favour of the life interest. Rather, dignity's association with both sides of the conflict resulted in the decision that the state's duty to protect life and the woman's basic rights must be balanced. The Second Abortion decision also illustrates the use of dignity as providing a common metric within which balancing of apparently incommensurable values can take place, and a metric which is not simply expressed as utilitarian. This, too, is a common practice in other courts which use proportionality. So, for example, in the South African Port Elizabeth Municipality case, the city sought an eviction order against a group of individuals occupying private land.

Although the City proposed that the group move to a different piece of land, the individuals rejected the offer because the proposed site of relocation was crime-ridden, crowded, and would not offer them security from another eviction. The City had housing to serve the needs of the poor, but contended that allowing individuals to receive priority in the allocation of this housing was tantamount to rewarding them for illegally occupying land. The Court found itself in a situation of conflicting rights: the right of the landowners not to suffer arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of their land, and the right of the squatters to have access to adequate housing.

Given that they were commensurate, the Court's role was to seek the solution that would best comport with dignity. When the Court decided that it would not uphold the eviction order, it justified its decision to limit the right of the landowners to be free from unlawful deprivation of their land as being the choice more congruent with dignity. Consider the similar role of dignity in the context of freedom of expression in the Canadian Supreme Court cases considering obscenity and hate speech.

In contrast, in the Canadian cases, the interests of the government were reformulated in dignity terms, and the result was markedly different. Thus, in Keegstra , we saw earlier that Dickson CJ conceptualized the protection accorded by the legal restrictions on hate speech as heavily engaging dignity. The majority considered that the right to freedom of speech was also underpinned by dignity.

Such open participation must involve to a substantial degree the notion that all persons are equally deserving of respect and dignity. In this case, according to the majority, since the speech is one that undermines dignity, the dignity-based reasons why speech ordinarily should be protected from interference are substantially reduced. But given the unparalleled vigour with which hate propaganda repudiates and undermines democratic values, and in particular its condemnation of the view that all citizens need be treated with equal respect and dignity so as to make participation in the political process meaningful, I am unable to see the protection of such expression as integral to the democratic ideal so central to the … rationale [for protecting free speech].

In my view, hate propaganda should not be accorded the greatest of weight in the [proportionality] analysis. How far should human rights instantiate international or local standards? For example, it allowed the South African court in Port Elizabeth to contextualize its decision in light of the history of apartheid. Indeed, some scholars have argued that this function of dignity has been vital in particular jurisdictions, not just in the context of individual cases but more generally.

Dignity was ideally placed to supply an alternative theory in this context, and we should not be surprised, therefore, to find it heavily used by the Court. At the same time, the use of imported law is couched in a discourse of globalization or ius commune, in which the Court presents itself as an active participant. The point is not simply that the concept of dignity is vague and open to interpretation and gives judges discretion; in that it does not differ from all human rights obligations and rights. Rather, my argument is that, just as dignity played a significant role politically in smoothing over the transition to human rights in the post-Second World War period at the international level, so too dignity is playing a similar role judicially, enabling rights to be interpreted in a way that domesticates them.

Its role, in practice, is to enable local context to be incorporated under the appearance of using a universal principle. Dignity, in the judicial context, not only permits the incorporation of local contingencies in the interpretation of human rights norms; it requires it. Dignity allows each jurisdiction to develop its own practice of human rights. Dignity has functioned, thirdly, as a source from which new rights may be derived, and existing rights extended. In the Israeli context, for example, human dignity has been seen as providing a basis on which to import rights that had not, intentionally, been included in the text of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

The most blatant exclusions are equality, freedom of religion and conscience and freedom of speech. Notably, several of the religious parties objected to their inclusion. Given that the self-perceived role of the Israeli Supreme Court is to assist in the building of an Israel that is committed to the broad range of human rights, that was unsatisfying. The challenged legislation had revoked the authority of the Secretary of State to provide support for asylum seekers who did not make a recorded claim for asylum as soon as reasonably practicable after arriving in the UK.

Nor were such asylum seekers permitted to work, even where they were destitute. The asylum seekers contended that the regime diminished their human dignity and violated Article 3 of the ECHR , which provided an absolute prohibition on torture, and inhuman or degrading treatment. Dignity was the standard for determining whether treatment rose to the level of inhuman or degrading treatment for the purposes of Article 3. How should we react to these institutional uses of dignity? Some may see the three uses of dignity as merely rhetorical. The courts use the concept of dignity merely to disguise, for example, the absence of a theory on how to resolve conflict between incommensurable values. Instead of making a choice between conflicting rights, they present the conflict as an issue internal to dignity.

Some may well consider that this approach obscures the moral issues which give rise to conflicts of rights, pretending that the problem is the absence of a common metric, where the real disagreement is deeper. There may be a similar reaction to the other uses of dignity discussed in this part of the article. If these arguments are accepted, then from a substantive point of view, dignity is a placeholder, but it has taken on a rhetorical function in these three distinct contexts to give judges something to say when they confront the really hard issues. Some, indeed, may consider this as a breach of the Rule of Law which, as conceptualized by Raz, requires decisions to be open, prospective, and clear, such that individuals are able to plan their lives around them.

Others may see the uses of dignity described in this part of the article as anti-democratic. This article is not the place to consider whether these arguments are convincing. My only purpose, I repeat, is to identify what seems to me to explain the increasing popularity of the concept of dignity among judges and advocates, not to justify these uses of dignity. Dignity has undoubtedly played a pivotal political role in enabling different cultures with vastly different conceptions of the state, differing views on the basis of human rights, and differing ethical and moral viewpoints to put aside these deep ideological differences and agree instead to focus on the specific practices of human rights abuses that should be prohibited, as Maritain suggested.

Dignity has helped to achieve this by enabling all to agree that human rights are founded on dignity. A basic minimum content of the meaning of human dignity can be discerned: that each human being possesses an intrinsic worth that should be respected, that some forms of conduct are inconsistent with respect for this intrinsic worth, and that the state exists for the individual not vice versa. The fault lines lie in disagreement on what that intrinsic worth consists in, what forms of treatment are inconsistent with that worth, and what the implications are for the role of the state. Although a more specific common theory going beyond the minimum core content was not necessary for the political acceptance of the Charter and the Universal Declaration, or for the acceptance of the subsequent human rights texts at the international, regional, and domestic levels, and attempts to generate one might well have been counter-productive, this did not help much when it came to the judicial interpretation of those specific rights that were enacted.

When judges read their texts and found that these rights were founded on human dignity, or found that there was a right to dignity as such, it was not surprising that some considered that dignity should be given a more substantive content. It is significant that dignity is so often drawn on where there is some personal security issue at stake torture, death , where equality is at stake including as a basis for limiting other rights like freedom of expression , and where some forms of autonomy are at stake abortion, sexual practices. This might have led and may still lead to the development, through discussion among judges nationally and transnationally, of an agreed transnational, transcultural, non-ideological, humanistic, non-positivistic, individualistic-yet-communitarian conception of human dignity which was absent when the Charter and the Declaration were being drafted.

I understand Carozza to be arguing that this is what is currently underway. We appear to have significant consensus on the common core, but not much else. I am not arguing that there is no more precise conception of human dignity that is possible beyond this minimum content. Nor am I arguing that there is no coherent extra-legal conception of dignity which could form the basis of a common transnational legal approach. The problem is rather the opposite: as the historical examination of the development of dignity indicated, there are several conceptions of dignity that one can choose from, but one cannot coherently hold all of these conceptions at the same time.

Dignity appears to become other than impossibly vague only when it is tethered to a coherent community of interpretation. But none of these currently provides a consensus conception of the legal use of dignity, and I am sceptical whether any of these could really provide a secure foundation for its judicial application in the future. When any one of these conceptions is adopted, dignity loses its attractiveness as a basis for generating consensus with those who do not share that tradition. The central meaning of dignity remains the common minimum core and judicial interpretation has done little, so far, to help us move beyond this.

So far, the use of the concept of human dignity has not given rise to a detailed universal interpretation, nor even particularly coherent national interpretations. No one jurisdiction has a coherent judicially interpreted conception of dignity across the range of rights, and no coherent conception of dignity emerges transnationally. But that does not mean that dignity has no role to play in the judicial interpretation of human rights. The absence of a consensus substantive meaning of the concept beyond that minimum core has not, it seems, prevented it from being used to enable a much looser coordination of human rights adjudication to take place, with significant room for disagreement and divergence over specific practical applications.

Rather than providing substantive meaning, a significant use is institutional: providing a language in which judges can appear to justify how they deal with issues such as the weight of rights, the domestication and contextualization of rights, and the generation of new or more extensive rights. It is a limited role, and possibly a different one from that played in philosophical, religious, and political debate, but it seems to me to go some way towards explaining its current, and I predict future, judicial popularity in human rights adjudication.

See, generally, D. Kretzmer and E. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey , US Wackenheim v. France , Comm. National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Compare the Act of Settlement Duffy and A. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis trans. Campbell, London, , Bk II, chap. In ibid. Compare the provisions in bilateral agreements relating to the preservation of the dignity and aesthetic character of the cemeteries by the state in which the cemeteries are located, where the cemeteries contain the war dead of another state.

See, e. Glenn Wallis, ed. Miller , at 5. Nolte ed. Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, , Art. Wordsworth, The Prelude , Book Thirteenth, lines 76— Agulhon, , at I am grateful to Rebecca Scott for drawing my attention to this reference. Alan Flanders has argued, e. Flanders, Management and Unions , at Schopenhauer, The Basis of Morality trans. Ansell-Pearson and C. This and the documents in the following four footnotes are available at: www. See also C. Curran, Catholic Social Teaching, —Present Here are a few. A report on the eviction of Kalahari Bushmen from their ancestral lands in Botswana 25 July included an interview with a young Bushman who had been forced to live in a settlement outside his ancestral lands.

I am grateful to Michael Rosen for drawing this to my attention. Here are just some examples: M. Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate ; J. Feinberg, Social Philosophy ; J. Meyer and W. But see Decree of 27 Apr. The Constitution of the Italian Republic, , Arts 3, 27, and The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, The Dijon Declaration, , translated in H. I am grateful to Brian Simpson for providing many of the references in the following para. United Nations, Yearbook on Human Rights for , at Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. GA Res. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 98, Art.

Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 98, Arts 37 and Art. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note , Art. The European Community's prohibition of sexual harassment is essentially based on the need to promote the dignity of the individual in the workplace. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note , Art. Constitution of the Hellenic Republic, 9 June , Art. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of , ss 1, 7, 10, 35, 36, 39, , , , and Sched 2. It may not be exploited or misused in such a way as may violate sanctities and the dignity of Prophets, undermine moral and ethical values or disintegrate, corrupt or harm society or weaken its faith.

The Preamble to ibid. All workers have the right to dignity at work. Accordingly, each State party pledges to take all the requisite measures to guarantee equal opportunities and effective equality between men and women in the enjoyment of all the rights set out in this Charter. All men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic obligations and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the basis of race, colour, language, belief, sex, religion, political affiliation, social status or other considerations.

The true religion is the guarantee for enhancing such dignity along the path to human integrity. Russell, supra note , at Declaration concerning the aims and purposes of the International Labour Organisation Declaration of Philadelphia , May The detailed drafting history is set out in the United Nations, supra note 78, Annex, at ff. See J. Maritain, , especially at On Maritain's role see Glendon, supra note Kaufman, Existentialism: From Dostoevsky to Sartre , at Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations trans. Anscombe, 2nd edn, , at 32 paras 66 and I am grateful to Gerald Neuman for this insight.

Simon and M. Weiss eds , Zur Autonomie des Individuums: Liber Amicorum Spiros Simitis , at , —, from which the three elements are derived. I am grateful to Jeremy Waldron for this insight. This also has several modern philosophical exponents such as Joel Feinberg and James Griffin, supra note So, Joel Feinberg, e. As persons they have the dignity to be treated as such. This is the principle of equality which constitutes one of the fundamental human rights and freedoms which are universal to al1 mankind. South Africa; Liberia v. Of all human rights, the right to equality is far and away the most important. It is also the one which has been longest recognized as a natural right: it may even be said that the doctrine of natural law was born in ancient times with the concept of human equality as its first element.

Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Ammoun translation in ibid. Belgium [] ICJ Rep 3 at Uganda [] ICJ Rep, at paras 6 and East African Asians v. Goodwin v. Pretty v. Law , Judgment of 31 Jan. Patterson , US , at dissent ; Duncan v. Kahanamoku , US , at concurrence. See further H. Trop v. For a review of the use of dignity in the US Sup. See generally S. Heyman, Free Speech and Human Dignity Lawrence v. Texas , US , at Kennedy, J. Polish Constitutional Tribunal, judgment of 17 Mar. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Kindler v. Equality and non-discrimination law encompass a wide variety of different measures, of course. Law v. Public Committee against Torture in Israel v.

Guatemala , Judgment of Nov. Mullin v. Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Khosa v. Rail Commuters Action Group v. Barak-Erez and A. Ghaidan v. Godin Mendoza [] 2 AC , at , para. Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights , at 5—6. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict Klein, supra note , at But see infra , text at notes — Makwanyane, supra note , at para.

Indeed, [it is] subsumed by that most basic of rights. Contrast approaches in India and South Africa, where affirmative action is regarded as a major method of fulfilling dignity: Thakur v. Corder, supra note 28, at , quoting Chaskalson, supra note , at Walter, supra note 71, at Similarly in Belgium see Court of Arbitration, judgment No. Bognetti, supra note 28, at 75, See further 99 BverfGE Minister of Finance decision of 12 Dec.

President George W. Station Film Co. See also Taylor v. See also Islamic Unity Convention v. BverfGE 64, , at — Although Klein, supra note , at , notes that in a subsequent decision this approach was not adopted. Shavit v. See further Kretzmer, supra note , at Mephisto case , BverfGE 30, ; Kommers, supra note , at Hamat Gader Spa Village Inc I am grateful to Tamar Feldman for providing a translation of the key parts of the judgment. Omega , supra note , at paras 34— For commentary on the case see M. Bulterman and H. Avides Media, not yet reported. Joerges and N. Hardy, Evans v.

In addition to the cases discussed in the text see also R. Carson v. It is not clear whether the FCC conceived that woman's dignity here is affiliated solely with the right to life or her right to personality, but the FCC appears to be associating dignity with both rights. Port Elizabeth Municipality v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept. See, however, C. For an interesting attempt to do so in comparing the judicial use of dignity in the US and Germany see E. Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.

It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Sign In or Create an Account. Sign In. Advanced Search. Search Menu. Article Navigation. Close mobile search navigation Article Navigation. Volume Article Contents Abstract. Oxford Academic. As noted above, some common law rights are largely conceived of as residual; they exist to the extent that no law is made that interferes with them. Human rights are rarely thought of in this way, and moreover have been said to grow both in content and form—more rapidly, some suggest, than common law rights.

Professor Tom Campbell has written:. More and more interests are recognized as justifying the protection that flows from being adopted as a human right. This growth is a matter of the form of human rights as well as their content. Thus, even traditional core civil and political liberties are seen as involving positive correlative duties to secure the interest identified in the right, and not, as before, merely negative correlative duties to let people be and leave them alone to go their own way. Human rights are also being put to a wider variety of uses. As important as these rights may be, they are not the focus of this Inquiry. For example, the guarantee of jury trial by s 80 of the Constitution in respect of indictable federal offences is conferred irrespective of the status of the accused.

The High Court has noted on several occasions that an alien, other than an enemy alien, is, while resident in Australia, entitled to the same protection with respect to civil rights as the law affords to Australian citizens. Nor do they abrogate the power of the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws that are inconsistent with the rights and freedoms set out in these instruments. Ratification of the ICCPR as an executive act has no direct legal effect upon domestic law; the rights and obligations contained in the ICCPR are not incorporated into Australian law unless and until specific legislation is passed implementing the provisions.

However, if it is not possible to construe a statute conformably with international law rules, the provisions of the statute must be enforced even if they amount to a contravention of accepted principles of international law. A list of other similar legal rights and freedoms was included in the last chapter of the Issues Paper. Relatively few submissions included comments on these other rights, and given the extensive scope of this Inquiry, the ALRC has chosen to focus on the 19 rights listed in the Terms of Reference. Traditions, culture and politics also play a role. By virtue of this unique connection with basic moral principles, the common law is thought to constitute the political community by incorporating a set of higher-order values against which the legality of governmental decisions may be tested.

Rights are the juridical residue of these higher-order principles and public law is reconceived as a vehicle for the protection of those rights against the state. In this Interim Report, the phrase is used to refer to the narrower point of statutory interpretation. Although the continuity of the principle is questioned in Lim, above n 37, However, individuals may say or do whatever they please provided they do not transgress the substantive law or infringe the legal rights of others. Before the Human Rights Act was brought before parliament, the government's whitepaper considered that it was necessary to prevent courts from setting aside legislation on the basis of incompatibility reflecting a strong need to respect parliamentary sovereignty. Section 3 has been defended, however, by reference to the enhanced morality and constitutionalism of the new system, prompted by an "incoming tide" of human rights.

However, other writers have stressed the importance of the formal right to ignore either decision. Geoffrey Marshall has characterised section 3 as a "deeply mysterious provision" in several respects, including judging how strong a provision it is — an issue since dealt with by the courts — but has also noted a disparity between what the Act might be expected to do and what it does. He argues that a litigant would hope that courts would strive to uphold his rights under the convention, accepting a derivation from them only rarely; instead section 3 requires courts to find compatibility with the Convention where possible — in other words, to strive to find that the Convention does not impact the claimant.

Young has examined the upper boundaries to courts' powers of interpretation. She puts forward three possible limits: firstly, where the text of a statute is not ambiguous; secondly, where reading in words is inappropriate; and, thirdly, where any interpretation is restricted to cases where it does not involve implied repeal. Young dismisses the first two as incompatible with the legislative history and, in at least the first case, judicial history and believes the third to present no rigid limit on courts' powers at all. The decision of Pepper v Hart provides a method for the legislative history of a bill to play a role in its interpretation.

Philip Sales and Richard Ekins are among those that believe that section 3 has not displaced the purpose of interpretation — to discern parliamentary intention. In their eyes, section 3 is about "how interpreters are to infer that intention". They also criticise the "judicial lawmaking" because it applies to the case in hand, concluding that this breaks the non-retroactivity commonly considered part of the rule of law , although it is sometimes necessary.

This leaves citizens uncertain of what the law is. Section 3, though, still allows them to do so. Another view is that Section 3 provides a much strengthened basis for the sort of "weak review" — the scope of which carefully determined between courts on one hand and parliament on the other — in a statutory form. There have been at least three criticisms put forward: firstly that the impossibility of implied repeal goes against some formulations of parliamentary sovereignty that require that no parliament can bind a future parliament.

Secondly, whether section 3 interpretations follow parliamentary intent is questionable; thirdly, if it does allow interpretations contrary to intent, section 3 may render section 4 necessary. However, judicial powers are probably not unconstrained. The analysis of what the courts can and cannot do would also provide the answer the third criticism, depending on the viewpoint. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Provision of the Human Rights Act Retrieved 11 January

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