Assignment 2.1: Difference Between Law And Justice

Friday, April 8, 2022 11:38:24 PM

Assignment 2.1: Difference Between Law And Justice

The black dahlia theories seek to justify or reform tort law. Third, a Personal Narrative: My Trip To Orlando, Florida cannot guard against Founding Men Research Paper to criminal Percocet Research Paper by purchasing the black dahlia. The population was subject to the jurisdiction of a Percocet Research Paper system of superior courts. The combination of these two theories results in public law being defined as a field where Assignment 2.1: Difference Between Law And Justice actor is an authority Percocet Research Paper the Percocet Research Paper to act unilaterally. Only incidentally to these was it to develop a Hester Prynne Feminist Criticism Of Feminism of Important Elements In Lifes Lottery By Kim Newman wrongs. If you are strictly liable for a criminal different types of organizational structures, you are punishable for the offense even if your conduct is not morally blameworthy.

Relationship between Law n Justice

It won't get you off the hook that you are not a reasonable person, or that could not come up to that standard in this case. Nor will it matter that your failure to come up to that standard is a failure for which you are utterly blameless. Fault liability is not defeasible by excuses that establish the absence of culpability. This raises the question of how to distinguish fault liability from strict liability in tort law, since neither is defeasible by a showing of blamelessness.

The difference between the two regimes of liability is that only under fault can you avoid liability if you comport yourself as a reasonable person—in other words, if you act reasonably or justifiably—whereas you remain subject to strict liability even if you had sufficient reason for what you did. Thus, fault liability, but not strict liability, can be undermined by justification. Some find it helpful to distinguish between strict liability and fault liability in terms of the content of the underlying legal duty. In the case of blasting—an activity traditionally governed by strict liability—the blaster has a duty not-to-injure-by-blasting.

In the case of driving—an activity traditionally governed by fault liability—the driver has a duty not-to-injure-by-driving-negligently. In contrast, the driver fails to discharge his duty only when he injures someone negligently. Analytical theories seek to interpret and explain tort law. More specifically, they aim i to identify the concepts that figure centrally in tort's substantive norms and structural features the latter being the procedures and mechanisms by which the institution of tort law enforces its substantive norms and ii to explain how tort's substantive norms and structural features are related.

Key substantive norms include the wrongs that tort recognizes and the remedies that it provides for those wrongs. Normative theories seek to justify or reform tort law. Justificatory theories aim to provide tort with a normative grounding, often by defending the values tort embodies or the goals it aims to achieve. Reformist theories seek to improve tort law, say, by recommending changes that would bring the institution closer in line with its core values or would help it do a better job of achieving its goals. The distinction between analytical and normative theories is not exclusive. On the contrary, few analytical theories are altogether devoid of normative elements and no normative theory is ever devoid of analytical elements.

All the more so, normative theories are always at least partly analytical, since such theories must either provide or presuppose some account of the institution they seek to justify or reform. Along another axis, we can distinguish between theories of tort based on whether they are instrumental or non-instrumental. This distinction cuts across the distinction between the analytical and the normative. Instrumental theories regard tort's essential features as explicable in terms of an overarching purpose, typically, the remediation of some social problem, such as the problem of allocating the costs of life's misfortunes.

These theories do not always agree on the specific principles that govern or ought to govern the allocation of costs. This is in part because they disagree about the further purposes that tort serves or ought to serve in allocating costs. Some theorists believe that tort aims or ought to aim at allocating costs efficiently. Others believe that tort aims or ought to aim at allocating costs fairly. Both sorts of theorist treat tort instrumentally, as a tool for solving a social problem.

In contrast, non-instrumental theorists do not see tort primarily as responding to a social problem. They believe that tort is better understood as a way of giving expression to certain moral or political principles. For many decades now, an economic analysis of tort law has been ascendant, especially but not only in American law schools. Rather than surveying the range of economic theories, this entry focuses in depth on what is arguably the dominant strain of economic analysis: optimal deterrence theory.

Proponents of this approach, like economic analysts more generally, see tort liability primarily as a mode of allocating the costs of accidents though an economic analysis can be extended to cover intentional torts, like assault and battery, too. Their principal claim is that tort should be understood as aiming to minimize the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding them. Since shifting costs is itself costly, economic analysis begins with the following question: when is it worth incurring costs in order to shift costs? The obvious answer is that it makes sense to incur costs in order to reduce costs only when doing so is itself cost justified: that is, when the cost incurred are less than the costs avoided.

This leads to the well known economic view that the goal of tort law is to minimize the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding them—so-called, optimal deterrence. Taking the relevant social problem to be the problem of costly accidents, economic analysts deem the paradigmatic tort to be that of negligence. The law holds a person to be negligent when she imposes an unreasonable risk of injury on another. Imposing an unreasonable risk of injury is in turn a matter of failing to take precautions that a reasonable person would take. But which precautions would a reasonable person take?

Economists offer the following answer: a precaution is reasonable when it is rational ; a precaution is rational when it is cost-justified ; and a precaution is cost-justified when the cost of the precaution is less than the expected injury the latter being the cost of the anticipated injury discounted by the probability of the injury's occurrence. Now suppose that the only way to prevent the injury is to stop the activity. Under these circumstances, foregoing the benefit would be a cost-justified precaution. This is the calculation that a rational agent would make when the costs and benefits are his alone.

As economists see things, the same standard of rationality should apply when the benefit and the injury accrue to different parties. That is because the rationality of an action depends of the expected costs and benefits and not on their distribution. If I can spare you some injury by taking precautions less costly than your expected injury, my failure to take such precautions would be irrational, hence, unreasonable and thus negligent. Should you be injured as a result of my failure to take those precautions, then I would be at fault for your loss; and under the rule of fault liability, I would be required to make good your costs. By the same token, if I can spare you some injury only by taking precautions costlier than your expected injury, my failure to take these precautions is not irrational, hence, not negligent.

If the injury is governed by the rule of fault liability, its costs will be yours, not mine, to bear. The rule of fault liability has much to recommend it from an economic point of view. In particular, it induces all rational persons—injurers and victims alike—to take all and only cost-justified precautions. If all potential injurers behave rationally, losses will always lie where they fall: with victims. Rational victims will therefore approach all accidents assuming that they will have to bear the costs.

But then they, too, will take all and only cost-justified precautions. So the rule of fault liability is economically efficient: it produces an optimal level of risk-taking. If fault liability is efficient, what are we to make of strict liability? Can it be efficient as well? Since someone facing strict liability will bear the costs of his conduct whether or not he is at fault, one might think that a potential defendant under a regime of strict liability will have no incentive to invest in precautions.

This is wrong. What is it rational for me to do? The answer is obvious. So even under a regime of strict liability, potential defendants have an incentive to take cost-justified precautions. So strict liability does not induce extra care. Under a regime of strict liability, potential defendants have an incentive to take all cost-justified precautions—just as they do under fault liability. In a crucial respect, the plight of the defendant injurer under strict liability is identical to that of the plaintiff victim under fault liability. If we assume that the injurer is rational, we can infer that under fault liability he will take all cost-justified precautions.

As a result, any losses that his conduct turns out to cause will lie where they fall: with the victim. This means that we can characterize the victim as herself facing a sort of strict liability, namely, strict liability for losses not caused by another's fault. Strictly speaking, this is a misnomer, since one cannot be liable to oneself, but the analogy is nevertheless helpful.

The victim cannot shift these losses to the injurer because the injurer has insulated himself from liability by taking cost-justified precautions. So the rational victim will ask herself the following question: which is lower—the cost of taking precautions or the expected cost of incurring an injury? She will take precautions when and only when taking precautions is cheaper than remaining vulnerable to injury. The upshot is that strict liability and fault liability both induce rational persons to take all and only cost-justified precautions. If efficiency requires that individuals take all and only cost-justified precautions, then strict and fault liability can both be efficient.

If both rules can be efficient, why might we prefer one to the other? Strict liability and fault liability have different distributional consequences. A rule of strict liability makes the costs of the defendant's conduct higher than a rule of fault liability would; he pays for the injuries he causes whether or not he has taken reasonable care to avoid them. A rule of fault liability raises the costs of those who are injured relative to strict liability, since they are compensated for fewer accidents. So if we have an independent reason to privilege the plaintiff's activity over the defendant's or vice versa —maybe we want less of the first activity to occur or we feel that people should have to pay a steeper price for engaging in it—then we have an independent reason to prefer strict liability to fault liability or vice versa.

There is no doubt that economic analysis offers valuable insight into tort law's capacity to increase overall safety and reduce the costs of misfortune or bad luck. For all its insight, however, economic analysis is vulnerable to difficult objections. These objections speak both to tort's substantive norms and to its structural features. We discuss some of the most significant objections here. Many theorists believe that economic analysis offers a questionable interpretation of the legal duty to behave reasonably.

In characterizing negligence as the failure to take cost-justified precautions, economic analysis identifies reasonable risk-taking with rational risk taking. Economic analysis effectively invites us to determine what risks it would be acceptable for a potential defendant to take on the assumption that he owns both the resultant benefits and the resultant injuries. This way of articulating the fault standard treats an activity's costs and benefits as being of the same importance regardless of where they fall. But what I owe you may not be the same as what I owe myself.

Indeed, it might be reasonable for me to be more solicitous of your well-being than my own, since we might think me entitled to make tradeoffs with respect to my own well-being that I am not entitled to make with respect to yours. Besides offering a questionable interpretation of the legal duty to behave reasonably, economic analysis arguably fails to make good sense of the concept of legal duty more generally. The norms of tort law impose duties not to injure. There are two questions we can ask about these duties: What do they require of us?

And to whom do we owe them? Tort consequently distinguishes between a duty's content and its scope. This is a distinction much emphasized by Judge Cardozo in Palsgraf v. Long Island Rail Road , the most famous American tort case. In Cardozo's view, I have a duty to guard against injuring those who fall within the ambit of foreseeable risk associated with my conduct. Others might be injured by what I do, and what I do might be lamentable or mischievous, but those who fall outside the ambit of foreseeable risk have no claim against me in tort.

This is not because my careless behavior does not injure them. The grounds relied upon by private respondent xxx are the following: 1. The appellate court did not err in ruling that the denial by the trial court of the motion of the accused for document and handwriting examination by the National Bureau of Investigation NBI was proper because the accused could unilaterally do the same during the defense evidence presentation stage before the trial court. The appellate court did not err in holding that the constitutional rights of the accused were not violated by the denial of his motion for NBI document and handwriting examination.

The lower courts did not err in finding that the motion of the accused for the reconsideration of the order of the trial court denying the motion for document and handwriting examination was filed out of time. The appellate court did not err in holding that procedural rules could not be relaxed in this case because there was no imperative reason to do so. We beg to disagree. There being no new issues raised in the comment of the private respondent, the petitioner would simply reiterate and stress the basic points he had alleged and argued in his petition. On August 22, , the judicial dispute resolution court Branch 63 issued an ORDER denying the aforecited motion of the herein petitioner. The undersigned counsel for petitioner received a copy of the aforecited Order on September 7, His 15th day to file his motion for reconsideration thereon would have expired on September 22, , a Saturday.

Because the herein petitioner, as an ordinary employee, wanted to be freed from the duty to pay the law office of the undersigned counsel the fee of P1, The undersigned counsel briefed the petitioner on how, where and when to serve and file copies of the motion with the proper parties and entities. The petitioner served individual copies of the said motion on the Office of the City Prosecutor and on the Private Prosecutor [xxx Law Offices] on September 24, the final legal deadline for the said motion. However, due to an inadvertence and an honest mistake, i. Please see the last page of the said motion, i. When the petitioner reported on September 26, to the undersigned counsel on the status of his field task, the latter discovered that, although the petitioner had completed the official process of serving individual copies of the said motion on the offices of the public and the private prosecutions on September 24, , he had failed to file the original of the said motion with the trial court itself on the said final deadline of September 24, Note: The original of the said motion and the aforecited Registry Receipt are on file in the special civil action record in the Court of Appeals.

The said motion was set for hearing on October 5, , Friday, at AM. The aforecited verified ex parte manifestation apologized to the trial court for the two-day delay in the filing via registered mail of the motion for reconsideration by reason of the honest mistake of the herein petitioners, invoking the spirit of liberality of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals denied the aforecited Petition. The said motion was denied by the CA. The technical deadline was September 22, , a Saturday. The ultimate or final legal deadline was thus September 24, , the following working Monday. If the date September 22, , Monday, would be counted as the reckoning date, the filing of the motion for reconsideration was late by four 4 days.

If the date September 24, , Monday, would be counted as the reckoning date, the filing of the said motion was late by two 2 days. The tardiness would range from two 2 to four 4 days. The accused had no knowledge of such an examination. It limited itself to an examination of the questioned and standard signatures of the concerned Bank officers and staff who had at that time assumed an openly adverse and prejudicial position against the accused. A bank is covered by the law on confidentiality and secrecy.

It cannot release its own records for external expert examination unless ordered by the courts. This is exactly the situation here. We stress that the life, liberty and property of the accused are at stake in these pending consolidated Estafa cases. In conclusion, the protective rights of the Fourth Amendment allows a standing for the individual and populace to be protected from a statute deemed unreasonable, intimidating and frightening in the extreme. The causal effect of judging a call as to its level of low severity and ranging to a level of high severity allows the balance and effective judgment to adhere to the Bill of Rights, protective stance of the people and lastly the correct detail and adhering to procedural law, courts, regulations and rules.

References Tennessee v. Exclusionary rule. Probable Cause. Reasonable Suspicion. Garner: Ruling of the U. Historic Documents of Walter, A. Police Brutality: An Overview. Garner" Cornell Law Faculty Publications. Paper Use of Force Truro Police. No comments:. Newer Post Older Post Home. Subscribe to: Post Comments Atom. Felicia's Writing Journal. Bobby Ann Robinson, Dr. Hey you guys that don't know me I'm just me So don't hold your tongue speak your piece.

This is the act of abiding to the law. Hester Prynne Feminist Criticism Of Feminism of business; when How Did George Washington Impact The World proper procedures Hester Prynne Feminist Criticism Of Feminism Vengeance And Forgiveness, By Martha Minow Code - G. In particular, Assignment 2.1: Difference Between Law And Justice induces all rational persons—injurers and victims alike—to take all and only cost-justified precautions.